

EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY, POSTMODERNITY, AND THE PROMISE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY

Dr. M. Kenzo

Professor of Theology, Canadian Theological Seminary, Calgary AB, CANADA

Dr. Enoch Wan

Professor of Intercultural Studies, Western Seminary, Portland OR, USA

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Postmodernity, interdisciplinarity, and evangelical theology are to a degree overused, if not misused, concepts. Their evocation is likely to generate indifference and their collocation raise eyebrows. On the one hand, interdisciplinarity presupposes the disciplinary practices that postmodernity opposes and, on the other, both interdisciplinarity and postmodernity do not easily rhyme with evangelical theology. This paper argues that beyond mere collocation, the rapprochement of interdisciplinarity and postmodernity can indeed lead to a fruitful cross-pollination that would benefit evangelical theology.

Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Postmodernity

One of the most important challenges that evangelical theology faces consists in overcoming the risk of its own marginalization. In their collective essay, "Evangelical Theology Today," Mark Noll, Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., and David Wells single out the issue of the lack of engagement with the culture as one that is at the core of the crisis that undermines evangelical theology. They go so far as to suggest that the groundwork for evangelical theology be laid anew. "The reason," they say, "is that, for all their dynamism and success at popular level, modern American evangelicals have largely failed in sustaining serious intellectual life."^[1] This failure is seen in that "intellectually, evangelical theologians and ministers have only just begun to span the yawning chasm between modern modes of thinking and the traditionalistic worlds of their congregations, where forms of thought have changed little over the last century."^[2] Their diagnosis, which is made with the context of modernity in mind, is confirmed and radicalized with the rise of postmodernity. Just as modernity dismissed Christianity on grounds of irrationality, postmodernity relegates it marginal irrelevancy. How, then, is one to engage theologically the culture of postmodernity? Interdisciplinarity, we believe, holds

great promises at this point. However, to better understand what is at stake here, we need to examine say what we believe is postmodernist's greatest challenge to evangelical theology.

Postmodernity has become an identity maker for whatever is characteristic of the episteme of our time.^[3] The emergence of this episteme and the evanescence of the modern have been described as "paradigm shift," or "epistemic revolution."^[4] The revolution or shift is a departure from the epistemic tradition characteristic of Descartes, Locke, Hume, or Kant. René Descartes, for instance, was concerned with one thing: certainty in knowledge.^[5] He believed that any knowledge that is certain is built upon firm and indubitable foundations. These foundations of knowledge, the primary building-blocks of knowledge, like his own "clear and distinct ideas," need to be self-evident, general, universal, timeless, and theoretical.

Michel Foucault, an important source of postmodern thinking, challenges Descartes' claims, arguing that there is no secure resting place for knowledge. He maintains that discourses belong not only to socio-historical origins, but also to epistemic contexts. The latter determine "on what historical *a priori*, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards."^[6] This leads him, first, to suspect any claim to universality and absolute certainty in knowledge. As Paul Rabinow comments, "For Foucault, there is no external position of certainty, no universal understanding that is beyond history and society."^[7] Second, the social condition of knowledge leads him to denounce the will to knowledge in Western modern episteme as a will to power and control.^[8] Any knowledge that is defined in terms of "clear and distinct ideas," "first principles," or "general theories," is essentially an abstraction. Such knowledge is utopian in the sense that it is removed from concrete life-situations. Foucault sees this knowledge as violence done to facts. It is violence because it sacrifices the subject and favors sameness and unity over alterity and difference.^[9]

Foucault's own alternative strategy, which he describes as genealogical in design and archaeological in method, is one that "seeks to develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction."^[10] Four principles determine his approach: reversal, discontinuity, specificity, and exteriority.^[11] Simply put, "when tradition gives us a particular interpretation of an event or an historical development, Foucault's strategy is to work out the implications of the reverse or opposite interpretation."^[12] Hence, it is typical of him to be interested in the irregular, the different, and the marginal. He sees history as discontinuous, whereas tradition has emphasized its continuity. His discontinuous view of history resists any attempt to construe grand narratives, teleologies, or totalizations.

Foucault's critique of modern episteme, with its epistemological foundationalism, is appropriated, continued, and radicalized by Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. Lyotard "takes the modernist preoccupation with language and pushes it to the extremes of dispersal."^[13] Language, he believes, is what Wittgenstein called an ancient

city. It is "a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; regular streets and uniform houses."^[14] The principle of unitotality or synthesis under the authority of a metadiscourse does not apply here. "[Nobody] speaks all those languages, they have no universal metalanguage, [and] the project of the system-subject is a failure."^[15] Lyotard uses the term "modern" to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse, that is, a discourse that makes explicit appeal to some grand narrative. Hence, modern sciences stand in contradistinction with postmodern sciences, whose starting point is "incredulity toward metanarratives." Postmodernity, he says, refines one's sensitivity to differences and reinforces one's ability to tolerate the incommensurable. "Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy."^[16]

Jacques Derrida applies the same postmodern insights to the reading of texts. In his poststructural approach to texts, he denounces the logocentrism of Western modern episteme. Logocentrism, which Derrida calls "white mythology," is the privilege given to spoken language in Western metaphysics. This privilege results in the repression of writing. As a corrective, Derrida announces the liberation of writing with his project of grammatology (from the Greek *gramma* meaning "letter" or "writing").^[17]

Derrida recognizes that, in the West, philosophers do indeed write. However, they do not think that philosophy ought to consist in writing. "The philosophy they write treats writings as a means of expression which is at best irrelevant to the thought it expresses and at worst a barrier to that thought."^[18] In their constant quest for the being of beings, they emphasize presence. In their metaphysics of presence, all true knowledge is carried back to some fundamentals, or some center, which is justified by an appeal to immediacy. The ideal for philosophy (metaphysics) in the metaphysics of presence is to contemplate thought directly. Since this cannot be done, philosophy has recourse to the mediation of language, which is required to be as transparent as possible. Even in its openness to the mediation of signs, that is, representation, the metaphysics of presence carefully maintains the distinction between the signified and the signifier. This distinction, in fact, belongs to a broader paradigm of binary oppositions of meaning/form, soul/body, intuition/expression, literal/metaphorical, nature/culture, intelligible/sensible, positive/negative, transcendental/empirical, serious/nonserious, and so on. In each case, "the superior term belongs to the logos and is a higher presence; the inferior term marks a fall . . . (a) complication, a negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first."^[19] Metaphysics of presence gives privilege to spoken language in virtue of "the absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning."^[20]

Derrida deconstructs the ground of the metaphysics of presence. His strategy consists in showing, first, the necessary mediation of the sign even in this metaphysics. He then argues that given the nature of a sign, which both repeats the originating presence and repeats itself, "the metaphysical task of the sign is forever stymied by the sign itself."^[21] A sign, in virtue of being a sign, does not and cannot signify presence purely and simply. Now, as the interpretation of a given sign leads back to other signs, the sign is no more but a trace, whose presence is forever deferred. Derrida argues that this

deferment (*différance*) has a leveling or decentering effect. There is no longer a hierarchical order between signified and signifier, whereby the latter are called to conform to the former. There is no longer need for a process whereby signs are given a center or a fixed origin within presence. Philosophy becomes the limitless play of signs or play of structure. There is no transcendental signified to limit the play of signs; no center to orient, balance, and organize the structure of signs.^[22] This allows Derrida, who carries out his own philosophical activity at the margins of Western philosophy, to emphasize what that tradition excludes: uncertainties, un-mediated contradictions, multiplicity, and dissemination.

In what way, therefore, does postmodernity challenge evangelical theology? In our view, it does so in two fronts. Better still, one may say that the same postmodern challenge has two related aspects, one epistemological and the other cultural. Postmodernity presents evangelical theology with an epistemic space where the rules of engagement have been seriously altered. Instead of a general metaphysics, it advocates a regional, discontinuous, heterogeneous, and pluralist approach to knowledge. It has no room for grand narratives or totalitarian theories. It maintains that every theorization must remain local and struggle “against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse.”^[23] Its view of knowledge is non-foundationalist, non-universalist, and non-systematic. Furthermore, postmodern epistemological space is non-conformist. It deliberately emphasizes the marginal, the different, and the irregular. Instead of discursive reason, it embraces aesthetic reason. To paraphrase Ihab Hassan, postmodernism believes in indeterminacy, emphasizes play and chance, cultivates anarchy, values the mutant, and embraces silence.^[24] Finally, postmodern epistemic space is pluralist and relativist. Its brand of relativism, however, is “one that is intellectually sophisticated, theoretically grounded, and methodologically rigorous.”^[25]

The first aspect of the postmodern challenge has received considerable attention. The numerous proposals of a non-foundational theology seek to address this aspect of the challenge.^[26] However, non-foundationalist theologies, chief among them narrative theologies, leave unanswered the question of the “openness to the world.” It is precisely at this point that interdisciplinarity turns out to be helpful.

The real impact of postmodernism on culture in general is difficult to assess. However, for the sake of the argument, let us assume that the postmodern critique of modernity has successfully undermined modern episteme. We will also assume that the culture of our time is genuinely postmodern. In other words, the prevailing postmodernity is not only an epistemic space, but a cultural space as well. How can evangelical theology engage this culture? Among evangelicals some have already warned against the danger of postmodernity with its iconoclasm, its radical relativism, or even its nihilism. The warning needs to be taken seriously. However, as others have also pointed out, postmodernity cannot be ignored, it has to be engaged.^[27]

Evangelical Theology and the Promise of Interdisciplinarity

Interdisciplinarity has already been suggested as a way to bridge the gap between theology and postmodern culture. Radical orthodoxy, whose best known representatives

are John Milbank, Stephen Fowl, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock, takes it as its challenge to fight the marginalization of theology.^[28] They take upon themselves "to reclaim the world by situating its concerns and activities within a theological framework."^[29] They do so not by "simply returning in nostalgia to the premodern." Rather, they seek to revisit "sites in which secularism has invested heavily—aesthetics, politics, sex, the body, personhood, visibility, space—and [resituate] them from a Christian standpoint; that is, in terms of the Trinity, Christology, the Church and the Eucharist."^[30] Their approach is interdisciplinary in that it "mingles exegesis, cultural reflection and philosophy in a complex but coherently executed *collage*."^[31] The ground for this approach is a version of Neo-Platonic notions of unity of truth and *analogia entis*. Anne Fortin-Malkevick also proposes interdisciplinarity as a means for theology to open up "to the world."^[32] Speaking from a tradition somewhat different from the evangelical, she even takes it that interdisciplinarity has already become "current practice" in theology nowadays.^[33]

There are, therefore, theological traditions that have appropriated interdisciplinarity as a way to engage postmodern culture. Can the same strategy serve evangelical theology? We believe it can. However, for interdisciplinarity to serve the cause of evangelical theology, it has to meet two requirements. It has to be contextually credible as an intellectual practice, and it has to preserve the integrity of the evangelical witness. The first requirement leads us to re-examine interdisciplinarity it has been understood in history.

A survey of literature on the matter reveals that interdisciplinarity is a fluid concept. It is easily defined by example (to designate what form it assumes), motivation (to explain why it takes place), by principles of interaction (to demonstrate the process of how disciplines interact), or terminological hierarchy (to distinguish levels of integration by using specific labels).^[34] Fundamentally, however, interdisciplinarity presupposes or seeks to foster the integration and interpenetration of disciplines. Seen from the vantage point of motivation alone, interdisciplinarity has a long history. For some, its practice goes back to Plato and Aristotle.

Since Plato, the postulate of the unity of knowledge has served to ground the idea of interdisciplinarity. This postulate is expressed variously in intellectual discourses. Sometimes it is expressed as unified science or general theory of knowledge, some other times as synthesis, mathesis, or integrated knowledge.^[35] Medieval theology knew its form of interdisciplinarity to which it gave a theological twist. It proclaimed theology the queen of sciences, turning all the other sciences into its servants.

Although the idea is old, interdisciplinarity as it is known today is a modern concept. It is "rooted in modern educational reforms, applied research, and movement across disciplinary boundaries."^[36] This movement of reform is itself a reaction to the overspecialization of academic disciplines in the nineteenth century.^[37] One leading voice in the crusade for interdisciplinarity is Jean Piaget, who based his proposal on the philosophical postulate of the structural unity of the mind.^[38] Structuralism, which finds its sources in the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure,^[39] maintains

observable phenomena of nature and human behavior belong to a surface structure which hides and reveals at the same time a deep structure. Phenomena, even when they do not belong to the same discursive universe or cultural universe, reveal the sameness of the human mind at the level of deep structure. At this level, all things are related and organized into strata of isomorphic systems "manifesting homeostatic self-regulation, and holism."^[40] Hence, interdisciplinarity is not option, but a necessity that lead to a unified theory of the universe (*une connaissance du phénomène humain total*).^[41]

Piaget maintains that as long as scientific research remains focussed at the phenomena of surface structure, that is, the observable, the necessary positivism of inquiry requires that the real be broken into manageable territories. Each territory is then assigned to a specific discipline. The process does not tolerate interdisciplinarity. However, he argues, once one move from surface structure to deep structure, the field of analysis is not only expanded, but the analysis of structures calls for revolution in scientific method. Piaget attributes the emergence and the justification of interdisciplinarity to this revolution.^[42]

One feature of interdisciplinarity, from Plato to Piaget, is its being grounded in the postulate of some unity. This can be unity of knowledge (Platonists, Aristotelians, and Medieval theologians) or unity of the human mind (structuralism). The problem is that postmodernism does not accommodate such a postulate. Furthermore, interdisciplinarity presupposes the differentiation of disciplines while postmodernism promotes de-differentiation. How can interdisciplinarity become credible in a postmodern episteme? The answer lies in the practice of interdisciplinarity itself.

An increasing number of scholars distinguish at least three levels (stages?) of integration in interdisciplinary practices. These are identified respectively as multidisciplinary, transdisciplinarity, and interdisciplinarity. A practice is multidisciplinary when more than one discipline is brought to bear on a problem without necessarily making explicit their interrelationships. As Klein says, interdisciplinarity is additive, but not integrative. Their [the disciplines'] relationship may be mutual and cumulative but not interactive, for there is "no apparent connection," no real cooperation or "explicit" relationships, and even, perhaps, a "questionable eclecticism." The participating disciplines are neither changed nor enriched, and the lack of "a well-defined matrix" of interactions means disciplinary relationships are likely to be limited and "transitory".^[43]

Transdisciplinarity is "a high degree of coordination of all studies . . . toward a common purpose based upon generalized and explicit set of assumptions"^[44] Characteristic of transdisciplinarity is the commitment to a comprehensive view of all knowledge. It holds out the promise of an overarching synthesis as can be seen in structuralism, cybernetics, or more recently, the string theory in physics. In transdisciplinarity, disciplines are "irrelevant, subordinate, or instrumental to the larger framework."^[45]

Interdisciplinarity is the *via media* between multidisciplinary and transdisciplinarity. An interdisciplinary approach is one where different disciplines, each in its relative autonomy, are brought to bear on "a collectively chosen problem or subject affecting changes in their own mutual perspectives and in their comprehension of the subject or solution to the problem."^[46] As Klein points out, the metaphor that best

describes interdisciplinarity is that of an organism. It has the advantage of putting knowledge into "live relationships." While the organic properties direct "attention to 'links', 'symmetry', 'convergence', 'conjuncture', 'interactions', 'interfaces', and 'integration itself.'" ^[47]

Applying a similar template to theological interdisciplinarity, Fortin-Malkevik identifies multidisciplinary with the theological practice following Vatican II. In her view, Vatican II introduced new objects--such as experience, praxis, pluralism, and language—into the field of theological reflection. There then developed modes of theology that sought to incorporate these new objects. These theologies, she says, "first of all applied theological methods to the spheres of objects hitherto external to theology." Progressively, they appealed to social, human, and linguistic sciences "to provide themselves with adequate instruments for apprehending these 'new realities'." Finally, however, these new fields of theological interest proved to be "conditions of possibility of the emergence of theological discourse." ^[48] That is, Theology has been led to go beyond the juxtaposition of instruments alien to its own approaches, to its own discourse, which has proved to be inhabited by "other" logics. Interdisciplinary work, conceived of first in terms of adjustments and openness, has proved to be a real Trojan horse. The introduction of the instruments of these sciences has led to the consideration of new rationalities and has exploded the very definition of theology. ^[49]

In other words, if we are to fulfill the requirements that we enunciated above, we interdisciplinarity needs to follow the *via media* between multidisciplinary and transdisciplinarity. Indeed, transdisciplinarity is today dubbed "pseudo-interdisciplinarity" ^[50] because it presupposes a relation of subordination between disciplines. Interdisciplinarity, for its part, seeks to overcome this negative legacy of the modern episteme. Instead of the overspecialization of knowledge and the "feudalization" of the disciplines, interdisciplinarity seeks to connect "the fields jealously guarded from one another by the traditional [modern] organization of knowledge." ^[51]

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End Notes

^[1]Mark A. Noll, Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., and David Wells, "Evangelical Theology Today," *Theology Today* 51 (1995): 495-507; Daniel Raul Alvarez, "On the Possibility of an Evangelical Theology," *Theology Today* 55 (1998): 175-95.

^[2]*Ibid.*, 497.

^[3]We borrow the concept of *episteme* from Michel Foucault who defined it as an epistemological space, which determines a priori what is accepted as knowledge. Cf. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), xxii. With some degree of convenience, David F. Wells speaks of "Our Time." Cf. David F. Wells, *No Place for Truth or Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology?* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).

^[4]For instance, Diogenes Allen says, "A massive intellectual revolution is taking place that is perhaps as great as that which marked off the modern world from the Middle Ages. The foundations of the modern world are collapsing, and we are entering a postmodern world." Cf. Diogenes Allen, *Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Wealth of Conviction* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1989), 2. See also Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Exploring the World; Following the Word: The Credibility of Evangelical Theology in an Incredulous Age," *Trinity Journal* 16NS (1995): 3-27; Thomas C. Oden, *After Modernity . . . What? Agenda for Theology* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992); and Stanley J. Grenz, *A Primer on Postmodernism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996).

^[5]As to the reasons for this quest for certainty, see Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).

^[6]Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xxii.

^[7]Paul Rabinow, "Introduction," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 3-29.

^[8]In his book, *Mental Illness and Psychology*, he argues that discourse on madness, which remains a discourse about the other, is essentially an exercise of power by practices of exclusion and control. He says, "Mental illness has its reality and value *qua* illness only within a culture that recognizes it as such." Cf. Michel Foucault, *Mental Illness and Psychology*. trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 60; the original French edition is, *Maladie Mentale et Psychologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954). See also Solomon, *Contemporary Philosophy*, 199.

^[9]Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *The Foucault Reader*, 76-100 and Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," in Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 215-37

^[10]David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 44.

^[11]Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," 215-37.

^[12]*Ibid.*

^[13]Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 46.

^[14]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 8, section 18 quoted by Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 40.

^[15]Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 40-41.

^[16]*Ibid.*, xiii-xxv.

^[17]Deconstruction here does not mean a vicious irrational demolition of the systems that have been erected. It is simply a strategy that exposes the weakness of a system by showing that it lacks genuine foundation, hence turning it on its head. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 20; *idem*, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 3-4.

^[18]Culler, *On Deconstruction*, 89-90. See also Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," *New Literary History* 10 (1978): 141-60.

^[19]Culler, *On Deconstruction*, 93.

^[20]Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 12

^[21]Kevin Hart, *The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 12.

^[22]Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 278.

^[23]Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 80.

^[24]Ihab Hassan, "Toward a Concept of Postmodernism," in Ihab Hassan, *The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), 84-96.

^[25]Veith, *Postmodern Times*, 56.

^[26]This can be seen in theoretical discussions of postfoundationalist theology or the concrete proposal of narrative theologies. Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, Nancy Murphy, and

Mark Nation, *Theology Without Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of Theological Truth* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994); J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, *Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997); and Nancy Murphy, *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda* (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1996).

^[27]Among the evangelicals who have exemplified this guarded optimism we may mention, by way of illustration, D. A. Carson, *The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996); Stanley J. Grenz, *A Primer on Postmodernism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Exploring the World; Following the Word: The Credibility of Evangelical Theology in an Incredulous Age," *Trinity Journal* 16NS (1995): 3-27; J. Richard Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, *Truth is Stranger than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a Postmodern Age* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995); and Nancy Murphy, *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda* (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1996).

^[28]Cf *Radical Orthodoxy*, eds. John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, (London: Routledge: 1998).

^[29]John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, "Suspending the Material: the Turn of Radical Orthodoxy," in *Radical Orthodoxy*, 1-20.

^[30]*Ibid.*

^[31]*Ibid.*, 2.

^[32]Anne Fortin-Malkevik, "Methods in Theology: Interdisciplinary Thought in Theology," in *Why Theology*, eds. Claude Geffré and Werner Jeanrond (Maryknoll: Orbis,

1994): 101-11. Fortin-Malkevick's proposal echoes an earlier one made by Jean Ladrière. However, the important difference between the two proposals is that they deal with two different intellectual contexts. One is modern and the other self-consciously postmodern. Cf. Jean Ladrière, "La démarche interdisciplinaire et le dialogue Eglise-Monde," in *Recherches interdisciplinaire et théologie* (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 45-64.

^[33]Ibid., 101.

^[34]Julie Thompson Klein, *Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 55.

^[35]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 19.

^[36]Ibid.

^[37]Ibid., 21.

^[38]Jean Piaget, *Epistémologie des sciences humaines de l'homme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).

^[39]Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (Paris: Payot, 1972). English translation, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983).

^[40]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 29.

^[41]Marcel Lefebvre, "L'interdisciplinarité dans l'action et la réflexion pastorales," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 947-62.

^[42]Piaget, *Epistémologie des sciences humaines de l'homme*, 43-52. See also Lefebvre, "L'interdisciplinarité dans l'action et la réflexion pastorales," 952.

^[43]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 56.

^[44]Richard Gelwick, "Truly Interdisciplinary Study and 'Commitment in Relativism'," *Soundings* 66 (1983): 422-36.

^[45]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 80-81.

^[46]Gelwick, "Truly Interdisciplinary Study and 'Commitment in Relativism'," 426.

^[47]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 81.

^[48]Fortin-Malkevik, "Methods in Theology: Interdisciplinary Thought in Theology," 102.

^[49]*Ibid.*, 103.

^[50]J. Thierry Maertens, "Sciences de la religion, écriture et épistémologie interdisciplinaire," *Sciences Religieuses* 4 (1974): 147-57.

^[51]Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 52.

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